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The pursuit of knowledge in the realm of military history was for a long time limited to the 
tactical and strategic breakdown of war. Many historical sources describe war in terms of large-
scale campaigns and battles, and thus, this was the subject of study. Surprisingly recent, though, 
has come the quest to better understand these matters on a more intimate level, that is, on the 
level of the individual combatant. The idea is that further study into the experiences of the 
combatants themselves may allow us to expand greatly our understanding of martial conflict. 
Books like John Keegan’s The Face of Battle, Richard Holmes’ Acts of War, and S.L.A. 
Marshall’s Men Against Fire1 have made tremendous strides in opening up academic circles to 
the values of their study. As a result, our perception of war and the ability to study it has 
benefited greatly. Therefore, it is a laudable mission to seek clarification of the question of ‘the 
face of battle’ in order to rectify any uncertainties about the nature of war. 
This pursuit becomes noticeably more difficult in the case of the ancient world. We are 
faced with the troublesome task of piecing together the experience of war in this era due to many 
limiting factors. In the field of modern history, one may go straight to multiple authors and 
investigate inconsistencies by comparison with an abundance of other sources. Often, accounts 
from both the opposing sides are available to hone our understanding of a specific war and its 
combatants. These luxuries are not afforded in ancient contexts. Writings from antiquity are 
subject to many constraints and bring to bear many questions, the solutions to which are largely 
conjectural due to sources’ old age and small quantity. In ancient Rome, writing history was a 
pastime for the aristocratic elite. Authors’ writings are often filled with the bias of their social 
class, and more importantly, the writers were commanders and did not have the frontline                                                         
1 Holmes Acts of War (New York: The Free Press, 1985), Keegan The Face of Battle (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1976), Marshall Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command 
(Glouchester: Peter Smith, 1978). 
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experience of the infantry. These men could also use their writings as a medium to demonstrate 
their own mastery of literary prose. Their works are potentially unreliable in discerning the 
actuality of events because of this. No known first hand accounts from frontline soldiers exist, 
and we get limited insight into their lives from our sources.  
The writings of Gaius Sallustius Crispus, or Sallust, are, unfortunately, no exception. Of 
his two fully extant works, the Bellum Jugurthinum is of greatest interest for the ‘face of battle’ 
question. Its subject, the Jugurthine War, pitted the imperialist state of Rome against the 
Kingdom of Numidia in North Africa in the years from 112 to 105 BCE. The conflict began 
when the prince Jugurtha made a grab for power by slaughtering his brothers, snubbing Roman 
wishes, and killing quite a few Italians on the way. Though some minor logistical and 
chronological inconsistencies exist,2 Sallust’s insight into the actual war is, in some ways, quite 
informative. Nevertheless, he still raises many questions. He did serve as a commander and 
governor under Julius Caesar, yet his military endeavors were limited and he was never a well-
accomplished soldier. As a result, his writings give plentiful coverage of the decisive and wide-
ranging decisions made by leading characters, their outcome, and their effect on the story. This 
means many descriptions of macro-politics, invasions, large troop movements, large battles, 
sieges, victories, and catastrophes. These are of vital importance to the whole of the story, yet we 
get no in-depth look into the smaller events of the war, nor the individual’s experience of them. 
In order to understand the war truly, this gap must be filled. Only after that can one claim to 
comprehend the nature of the Jugurthine War, and of war in the late Roman Republic. 
Thankfully, we are not limited to pure supposition. In the process of telling his account, 
Sallust inadvertently sheds some light onto this unknown subject through his general descriptions 
                                                        
2 Syme, Sallust (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), 142-150 
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of the war and combat. These various hints can be pieced together with knowledge from other 
martial sources to help paint a more complete picture. Caesar’s writings are exceptionally useful 
in this pursuit, as they share a similar chronology and are written by one of the greatest military 
minds of the late Roman Republic. Caesar’s experience of war was extensive, and he built his 
career upon martial achievements and his own soldierly toil. Though not of the same time period, 
other ancient sources like Livy, Plutarch, and Ammianus also give us constructive comparisons. 
Modern cases also present valuable, and better-attested, cross-cultural insights into combat 
despite the social transformations that have occurred between antiquity and the present. In the 
scope of modern human development, two thousand years is not a long enough time to change 
such basic responses like ‘fight or flight’, thus making select modern examples applicable to the 
ancient Roman context. By combining pieces of Sallust’s account with other ancient sources and 
modern examples, we may more fully understand and appreciate the Roman infantrymen’s 
motivations and experience of war in the late Republic, and by extension, war itself.  
To do this we must explore four major categories of life on campaign: the men involved, 
discipline and army life, battle, and siege. I start with an in-depth look into the sort of men we 
may expect to have fought in the Jugurthine War. Next, their life in the martial setting will be 
analyzed by examining daily routine and discipline. The study then turns to the face of combat 
and the experience of Roman soldiers in it, including a look into physical burdens, battle 
atmosphere, morale, and panic. Finally, I will end on the problem of siege and the additional 
struggles it caused for the individual, and what that looked like.  
 
Demographics of the Roman Fighting Man 
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The first aspect of the war that must be explored in order to understand its combatants is 
demographics. This is the most basic, but still drastically important, feature to know about the 
Roman soldier’s experience in the Jugurthine War. No matter what happens in a conflict, the 
events are all viewed and interpreted by the different perspectives of each soldier. Understanding 
whom the average individual was is key to knowing his experience of a martial life and his 
willingness to endure harsh discipline.3 Age, background, and motivations should all be 
considered. Sallust and Plutarch wrote about the nature of the soldiers who signed on with 
Marius, yet sadly have little to say concerning other demographic details about volunteers or 
levied troops. In addition, they both fail to address the complexities of Marius’ reforms. Marius 
was the first Roman commander to accept large numbers of volunteers from the lowest census 
class – the capite censi, or those “counted by head“ instead of wealth – into the infantry. His 
actions greatly complicated the army’s characteristics, as it became a mixed force in respect to 
the types of soldiers in it. Luckily, many ancient authors offer some mention on the 
demographics of the soldiery. It is still possible to piece together a respectable amount of 
information about the average Roman soldier by drawing off of Vegetius, Plutarch, Livy, and the 
laws of Gaius Grachus in addition to Sallust. All emphasize the dichotomy between the levied 
troops and the volunteers. Because of this, we can easily separate the two groups and consider 
their characteristics separately. So by exploring and extrapolating from the information left to us 
in the original sources, we may still gain an educated picture of the characters fighting, even if 
we must address two ‘types’ of soldiers.  
 The army of the Republic prior to Marius was more mixed than after his reforms. 
Because of the levee system, which chose the male citizens that would go to war in times of                                                         
3 Motivations on the field of battle should be treated separately and will be discussed at a later 
point in this paper.  
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need, the ages of the soldiers were fairly diverse. Logically, the draft would have been aimed at 
men in their prime, but older or younger men were selected in times of extreme need. Sallust 
mentions nothing concerning the age of the draftees under Metellus or Marius. Vegetius, writing 
of ‘ancient custom’, by which he means Republican times, gives us much insight. He claims that 
soldiers were levied at the beginning of puberty, and Sallust writes much the same in his account 
of the Catiline Conspiracy.4 This seems much too young for this period, as Gaius Grachus’ Lex 
Militaris (military law) raised the minimum age for draftees to seventeen years, although some 
boys likely lied about their age in order to share in the glories of war. In the modern era we have 
seen how a large number of infantrymen were well under the age limit of the time, like the boy 
soldiers of the Civil War or of the American-Vietnamese War. Nevertheless, I do not think it 
likely that these numbers were large enough to affect the data. Therefore, the lower limit for age 
was likely around seventeen. As for the upper age limits, it would be right to consider fifty a 
rough cut-off point, as stated in Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita. However, soldiers of this age were very 
unlikely to have been in the Roman armies of the Jugurthine War since their allowance into the 
military was a rare circumstance.5  So given this wide range of data, I believe it would be safe to 
say the average age in a levied army would be around the late twenties.6 This would fit with 
Vegetius’ requirement for physical ability, match descriptions in Livy, and would allow for a 
good amount of experience within the legion of draftees.  
Once members of the capite censi were allowed to volunteer en masse, this age figure 
had the potential to change. We cannot accurately account for their impact on the data because of 
limited knowledge, as Sallust gives us no indication as to the age or specific numbers of the 
                                                        
4 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science 1.4. Sallust, Cataline Conspiracy 7.4 
5 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 40.26, 42.31 
6 Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (Boston: Brill, 1999), 9-14. 
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capite censi who joined Marius’ army. Neither do his writings, unfortunately, give us an idea of 
the size of the Roman army in Numidia. We do know a large portion of the army Marius took to 
Numidia was made of volunteers, so we can assume that their presence would have affected the 
data measurably.7 Their stated motivations, money and sustenance, and the fervor with which 
they enlisted also give us a slight hint as to their age. We get the strong sense that they were 
adventurous fortune seekers wishing to create better lives for themselves. This indicates a 
younger age group. It is impossible to surmise their ages with any more accuracy than by this 
supposition. Based on the information at hand, the lower twenties age range seems most likely. 
Older volunteers were certainly present, but not to the same extent as the young. Despite the 
large numbers that volunteered for Marius’ army, the force that he received from Rutilius in 
Africa, as well as the troops he was allowed to levee in Italy, were both armies of draftees.8 With 
this in mind, it would be reasonable to put the average age of the whole army under the control 
of Marius as around twenty-five to twenty-seven. 
In the modern world, many might see younger soldiers as vulnerable and especially 
susceptible to the harshness of war. Let us keep in mind that the ancients, even the younger ones, 
were much closer to death than the modern, and more used to it. Psychological casualties were 
certainly a concern, just as in a modern army, but the Romans were more likely to resist them. It 
could be arguable that the chaos that resulted in Albinus’ army was due to psychological distress, 
but Sallust much more portrays their failure as a result of the general’s wrongdoing than the 
squeamishness of the soldiers. For the most part, these were not boys, but hard, young men who 
went on and served Rome well.  
                                                        
7 Sallust, Jug. 84-86. 
8 Sallust, Jug. 84, 86. 
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The backgrounds of the Roman men are much easier to see and more clearly explained in 
Sallust. The force Marius set sail with from Italy was made up of a large amount of poor 
volunteers who were allowed to join the army at Marius’ allowance. Much of the urban mob was 
made up of families, who, within the last century, had migrated to the cities after the failure to 
sustain themselves in the country. That was too long ago for the young men of the capite censi to 
remember or experience. Therefore, many of the men who signed on with Marius were poor and 
made their living by any means possible. The aristocratic authors saw this as a terrible thing. 
Vegetius emphasizes the supposed superiority of a rural stock of soldiers: 
On this subject I think it could never have been doubted that the rural populace is better 
suited for arms. They are nurtured under the open sky in a life of work, enduring the sun, 
careless of shade, unacquainted with  bathhouses, ignorant of luxury, simple-souled, 
content with a little, with limbs toughened to endure every kind of toil, and for whom 
wielding iron, digging a fosse and carrying a burden is what they are used to from the 
country.9  
 
By this same logic, the soldiers from the city were plagued with vice, and made terrible soldiers 
because of their comparatively soft lifestyle. This was the typical bias of the Roman aristocracy. 
Urban mobs were always looked down upon as the desperate poor, while many writers saw 
Rome’s agricultural origins as the source of its greatness. Marius’ new enlistment style ran 
directly contrary to these opinions. In the end, these poor men were just as able of military 
service as any other, and proved good soldiers who were more than willing to endure hardship.10 
Also, given that the capite censi was only a portion of the army, the majority would still have 
been close to meeting Vegetius’ ideal. 
  Some draftees would also have been relatively poor because of Grachus’ drastic 
lowering of the property qualification to bolster army numbers. Even this large drop was only the 
                                                        
9 Vegetius I.III 
10 Plutarch, Life of Gaius Marius 13.1 
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next step in a trend of falling qualifications, as during the Hannibalic War the requirement fell 
from a worth of eleven thousand asses (bronze coins) to four thousand.11 Despite this there was 
still a property qualification, and for the most part it seems that these members of the army sent 
to Africa would have been acceptable to traditional eyes. That is, the citizens were landholding 
members of the tribes who were drafted into the heavy infantry and fought until the threat was 
extinguished, after which they would return to their land.  
The culmination of all that has been discussed so far lies in exploring the motivations that 
drove these soldiers to go to war and submit to military discipline. It is clearly enough stated 
with the volunteers. Sallust claims that, for the poor, “whatever will put something into their 
pockets is right and proper in their eyes.”12 For Sallust, the main motivation for volunteering was 
monetary. Though his bias is obvious here, there is no reason to doubt him. Throughout the early 
part of his account, there are many statements about the seemingly endless wealth with which 
Jugurtha bribes Roman senators.13 Sallust’s comments here could reflect the typical notions of 
the aristocratic writers: that Rome was in a state of moral decay after the absence of metus 
hostilis (fear of an enemy). This manifested itself in an overstatement of Jugurtha’s bribes in 
order to emphasize Sallust’s own notions of virtus (virtue) and its yield to libido (desire).14 
Despite this, it seems logical that tales of Numidia’s wealth would have attracted many Romans, 
and allowance into the army became an opportunity to thicken their pockets with that wealth. 
They were not disappointed, as Plutarch recorded the winnings after the war as nearly nine 
thousand pounds of gold and silver with two hundred and eighty thousand drachmas.15 Whether 
                                                        
11 Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Army (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), 4 
12 Sallust, Jug. 86. 
13 Sallust, Jug. 13, 29.  
14 Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961) 
15 Plutarch, Life of Gaius Marius 12.4. 
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these winnings were manubiae, public money intended for games, triumphs, and public 
enrichment under control of the commander, or loot intended for the soldiers is not clearly 
explained in Plutarch. We can assume that some of the above stated amount was manubiae and 
not distributed to the army, but the goods that were personally looted by the soldiers were pooled 
and distributed amongst themselves as praeda.16 The total amount given to us represented nearly 
two million days wages for a soldier. Surely the men could expect to see a large amount of this, 
even if a quantity of it were appropriated for public use. Sallust looks down upon this impulse for 
money, and it certainly got the Republic into trouble later as men became utterly dependent upon 
their commander, but at this early time it was a perfectly legitimate motivation for most people. 
It did not hamper the soldiers’ effectiveness in the war, nor did it lessen their ability to withstand 
life on campaign. In fact they excelled in combat and under Marius’ discipline, which was a 
continuation of Metellus’ practices with his ‘traditional’ army.17 Men from the capite censi 
volunteered and accepted army life so that they could acquire enough money, through pay and 
loot, to earn a living and better their lives.  
It is difficult to discuss motivations when looking at the levied soldiers, as they had no 
choice but to go to war. Service was very unpopular at this time, most likely due to the conflicts 
in Spain. The hostile senate was counting on this fact when they allowed Marius to build his 
army, yet they misjudged, and Romans were still enthusiastic to go to war in Numidia.18 So why 
were these men willing and eager to withstand military life in a time when it was said to be 
unpopular? If we believe the ancient historians, men fought for idealistic reasons. Patriotism and 
                                                        
16 Churchill, “Ex Quo Quod Vellent Facerent: Roman Magistrates’ Authority Over Praeda and 
Manubiae,” Transactions of the American Philological Association, Vol. 129 (1999): 85-116 
17 Sallust, Jug. 87, 88. Plutarch, Life of Gaius Marius 13.1, 15.2-.3.  
18 Sallust, Jug. 84, note that this is in reference to Marius’ soldiers, yet ones that he was legally 
drafting.  
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necessity were certainly possible motivations, A great deal of the men under Metellus must have 
heard of the disaster in Numidia, and likely considered Jugurtha a real threat to Rome. The men 
who fought under Albinus knew this first hand, as they had suffered defeat from Jugurtha’s 
army. Sallust also states that all of the citizenry were engaged in helping Metellus prepare for 
campaign, likely because of their fear of Jugurtha.19 The war was in Africa, but many soldiers 
might have believed that they were protecting their homeland.20 Another possibility that Sallust 
indicated was a strong tendency for Romans to emulate the great deeds of ancestors. 
I have heard that Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio, and other illustrious citizens of our 
state, used to say that the sight of their ancestor’s portrait masks fired their hearts with an 
ardent desire to merit honor.21  
 
Honor can be a great motivation to withstand punishment. Though these soldiers had to go to 
war, the social pressure to assume the burden honorably must have been immense. Lendon gives 
great importance to the role this played for soldiers. Members of the army created their own 
community, in which the judgment of their peers was of great influence. “Honor and shame 
among soldiers were grounded in success in war…”22 This was applicable in both military life 
and also in combat. Sallust spoke despicably of soldiers and generals who failed to act honorably 
on behalf of Rome. On a more positive note, the cordial relationships among soldiers in their 
community could have also given them motivation to endure hardship. The organization of men 
into contubernia, or squads, is argued to have nurtured an intimate bond between its members. 
These bonds would have made the men feel more at comfortable in their martial lives.23 In 
                                                        
19 Sallust, Jug. 43 
20 Sallust, Jug. 87: armis libertatem patriam parentisque et alia omnia tegi 
21 Sallust, Jug. 4.  
22 Lendon, Empire of Honor (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997), 243 23 Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War: 100 BC-AD 200 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 257 
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addition, many were willing to serve because of utter confidence in Marius’ boasting, and were 
confident in Marius’ ability to earn them glory and wealth:  
…most of the men were eager to go overseas with Marius, imagining that they would 
make a fortune out of the spoils, return home victorious, and so forth.24  
 
This brings us to the largest motivator. Though there are many mentions stating the greed 
of the capite censi, and it does not seem that drafted soldiers’ motivations were drastically 
different. In his speech after the Battle at the River Muthul, before Marius enacted his reforms, 
Metellus reassured his troops that from that point on, they would “be working to obtain booty.”25 
This could have been meant to be a relief to the soldiers, that Rome was no longer at risk. Still, 
the motivational factor based on greed is evident. After Jugurtha laid an ambush upon the Roman 
scouts and foragers, Metelllus put an end to marauding by isolated bands.26 This indicates both 
that soldiers were allowed a fair amount of freedom in pillaging before this, and also that they 
still did afterwards but only in better-protected groups and on a smaller scale. Upon landing in 
Africa, Marius’ first act was to plunder the countryside and let his soldiers have the spoils, 
contrary to practice, in order to gain the favor of both draftees and volunteers in his army. It 
makes perfect sense that soldiers were concerned with money. They were paid for their service, 
and after the lex Militaris, soldiers were no longer docked for their equipment. Nevertheless, this 
was not meant to be used as a bonus or to reward a soldier for service, only to cover expenses 
while on campaign until the man could return to his occupation at home.27 Surely it is not 
unrealistic that most men were interested in bettering their financial standing. They were not as 
influenced by a desire for wealth as the capite censi volunteers who needed it, and surely factors 
                                                        
24 Sallust, Jug, 84 
25 Sallust, Jug. 54.  
26 Sallust Jug. 55. 
27 Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 2003), 94.  
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like honor, patriotism, comradery, and necessity played a part. But it would seem that for the 
majority of the army, money and personal advancement was the primary incentive to endure the 
harsh military life.  
 
Life on Campaign 
  
 The soldier spent an overwhelming majority of his life not in combat, but rather, in a 
multitude of other day-to-day activities that were necessary for an army on campaign to perform. 
Because of this, it is essential to understand a Roman soldier’s daily life if one hopes to form a 
solid perception of Roman martial life in the Late Republic. Many historians choose to focus on 
combat and its effects on the combatant when studying war on the individual’s level, as battle is 
the most intense and characteristic part of war. To truly understand the subject of war, though, 
we must determine the whole of a soldier’s life, not just the most intense bits.  
The intricacies of the soldiers’ existence are details rarely explained in historical 
accounts. This is true in Sallust’s case. He himself was a member of the Senatorial Class and his 
writing reflects what he thought was most important: the commanders’ decisions and the main 
events that happen because of them. It makes sense, as these events are the most important to the 
outcome of the war. Sadly, though, the typical soldier’s daily routine did not fit into this practice, 
as it often did not seem important to the scope of the account. As a Roman senator, Sallust would 
most likely have found such things trivial, and therefore not worthy of mention. Nor would 
ancient readers have found this significant, as that sort of thing belongs in a military treatise, not 
a history. It is also very likely that he took for granted the army’s daily practice as common 
knowledge. Those who might have read his work were most likely patricians (nobles) and 
aristocrats, either completely uninterested or generals themselves familiar with the subject.  
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In the end, we do not get any firm explanation of the daily routine of a soldier. Yet it is 
possible to glean some useful knowledge from Sallust’s account by detailed examination of 
passages involving the soldiers and comparison with known practices. We get glimpses of daily 
life only when their routine was broken, such as when Metellus takes command of Albinus’ 
army, or when extreme conditions occurred like a march across the desert. We can extrapolate on 
these passages by adding useful knowledge from known contemporary exercises. Thus, despite a 
shortage of source material in this area, we may still learn more of the military life while on 
campaign.  
The dominant factor in a Roman soldier’s life was control and discipline. In order for an 
army to function, the soldiers needed to be accountable for the orders given to them. He marched 
daily under the hot Mediterranean sun, lugged his own gear, built and took down fortifications 
daily, was subject to all sorts of duties and training exercises in camp, and for the most part, was 
willing to endure this life. What practices enabled this? The first step would have been a military 
oath called the sacramentum. In it, soldiers swore to obey their commander until released from 
duty.28 Such an act seems trivial to many, for what would stop a man from lying or going back 
on his word? In modern times, soldiers still take an oath like the sacramentum, and it holds a 
surprising amount of sway over their actions. US Army deserters in the mid 20th century claimed 
that they signed their oaths in pencil in order to ease their conscience, and the oath acted as a 
massive deterrent for dissidence among the Nazi officer corps.29 In addition to this, as the name 
                                                        
28 Roth, Roman Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 66 
29 Holmes, Acts of War 33 
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implies, the sacramentum had religious power as well.30 This oath should not be taken as a minor 
burden on the conscience of a man.  
Training also helped to create obedience. In modern armies, this is represented by close 
order drill and parade maneuvers. The idea is that constant and unrelenting drill of a skill will 
inculcate that skill into the soldiers mind so he may perform it without thinking. This works with 
obedience as well.31 However, this practice had the possibility of eliminating the individual’s 
incentive and drive, which is precisely why the Romans did not employ such a method. Instead, 
they created soldiers by immersing the men in a constant and demanding regimen of labor.  
One of the most notable passages in The Jugurthine War is when Spurius Albinus hands 
over control of his army to Metellus. This army was in a shambles. The men plundered the 
surrounding territory freely, whether it was friendly or not, they neglected to maintain 
castrametation practices or even attend any of their duties, wandered about as they wished and 
fraternized with the camp followers, procured many extra servants to do their work, and didn’t 
move their camps until forced to by the stench of their own refuse. Sallust states that Albinus 
could not even use his troops after their defeat under his brother Aulus because of “relaxation of 
discipline.” This did not mean solely a cessation of punishments for lapses of obedience, but 
mainly that the soldiers were allowed to neglect their standard labors. To the Roman mind, a 
large workload kept soldiers acting correctly. The building of camps and other laborious 
practices functioned as close-order drill for the Romans.32 When soldiers became rambunctious, 
it was because they were idle and had gotten used to vice. Tacitus wrote that the Pannonian 
                                                        
30 Lee, “Morale and the Roman Experience of Battle,” Battle in Antiquity, ed. Alan Lloyd 
(London: Duckworth, 1996), 207. 
31 Idem, 39 
32 Phang, Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early 
Prinipate (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 67.  
  15 
legions were more subject to their revolt because of the slackening of labor, and by resting in the 
city of Capua, Hannibal’s army was rendered ineffective as well.33 
The Roman commanders always kept their soldiers busy in order to maintain control, so 
that is exactly what Metellus did to shape up Albinus’ old army: “he (Metellus) decided not to 
take the field until he had inured the men to hard labor by putting them through a course of old-
fashioned training.”34 He eliminated all excess servants from the camp and baggage trains, 
moved camp continually and fortified it with a wall and trenches, marched the men daily, and 
ensured each man carried his own gear and food. This whipped his soldiers back into Roman 
standards by forcing them to do the great amount of work expected from them. Marius did much 
the same, and to the extent that his soldiers were called Marian Mules. Later, when his army had 
nothing else to do in the Cimbrian/Teutonic War, he set them to clearing mud and obstructions 
from the mouth of the Rhone River so that they remained active.35 This was a grueling process 
for an individual, as we shall see in a bit, but it seemed to have effectively gotten him used to 
military life and instilled purpose and pride in him. After a time one’s body would have adapted 
to these struggles. The Roman men grew used to the strict schedule, and acquired a positive 
attitude that gave them drive and confidence in their identities as soldiers.36  These practices 
started by Metellus continued throughout the war. Even so, this system was not perfect, and there 
was still a sizable amount of deserters.37  
Many people assume brutal punishments were used to ensure the obedience of the Roman 
soldier. They would not be completely wrong, but everyday discipline was rarely an act in                                                         
33 Tacitus, Ann. 1.16, Phang 223.  
34 Sallust, Jug. 44 
35 Plutarch, Life of Gaius Marius 13.1, 15.2-.3 
36 Holmes, Acts of War 43 paired with Phang’s comments about labor functioning as a Roman 
soldier’s equivalent of close order drill on pages 67 and 221-223.  
37 Sallust, Jug. 56, 76 
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suppressive violence as assumed. Minor acts of violence, for example, forceful disciple by a 
centurion’s vitis, or vine, was almost certain to have occurred. But we also hear of much more 
sever punishments. Though the soldiers were Roman citizens, while under service of arms they 
were indeed subject to brutal and fatal penalty from a commander with imperium. A soldier 
caught sleeping on watch could be beaten to death by his comrades, and commanders could 
decimate (to kill one out of every ten) a group of soldiers who ran in battle. However, the extent 
to which this actually happened in our time frame was small. Sallust did not mention these 
penalties at all. In fact he applauded Metellus and Marius for disciplining their men without 
inflicting punishment.38 Their practices included keeping the men busy, rewarding them for 
positive behavior, and calling on their honor. Other generals of the Late Republic used shaming 
punishments like feeding soldiers barley instead of wheat and forcing them to stand at attention 
without their clothes. These punishments, ‘appeals to their honor’ as stated by Sallust, show that 
soldiers of this time were very eager to maintain honor, and that such appeals were the mark of a 
good general.39  
Now let us turn to the actual doings of the Roman soldier on campaign. Marching was a 
huge part of life for the men fighting in Africa, and it always has been the defining action of 
infantry on campaign. I need not say how important the need to move was, and the Roman army 
excelled in traveling quickly, especially after the changes enacted by Metellus and more 
decisively by Marius. The Roman soldier was expected to march twenty roman miles in five 
hours, and twenty-four when in a hurry, or about eighteen and twenty-two English miles 
respectively. This makes for a pace of roughly three to five miles every fifty minutes, as they 
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likely took about a ten-minute break every hour. This is in no way unrealistic, and soldiers in 
WWII sometimes marched up to thirty miles in a day.40 Nevertheless, this was still with a large 
burden, and we must determine the weight that they carried on those distances to fully 
understand that burden. When Metellus took control of the forces in Africa, he eliminated excess 
slaves, servants, and beasts of burden attached to the army – as opposed to Albinus, whose men 
had purchased slaves and other porter animals to do their soldierly duty for them. But how could 
the army have gotten along without these things? Surely, a Roman army used slaves, most of 
whom were used in the baggage train driving beasts of burden and supplying the soldiers with 
some of their gear, as the men could not have realistically carried it all as we will discuss shortly. 
Sallust meant that Metellus did not dismiss all slaves and servants, just the ones who the lazy 
soldiers exploited.41 He must have allowed the use of slaves and porter animals in the baggage 
train, and only abolished them from the army in camp and on the march.42 Also, Sallust clearly 
states that beasts of burden were still with the army on their march to Thala: 
Accordingly he issued orders that every pack animal should be relieved of all luggage, 
and nothing carried but 10 days rations of grain, together with skins and other containers 
for water.43 
 
So, while the army still used a sufficient number of slaves and animals, let us not think that the 
Roman soldier’s burden was still not great.  
A contubernium would have had to carry many things: armor, clothes, weapons, cooking 
equipment, tools, food, a tent, a stone mill for grinding grain, personal equipment, and pila 
muralis, or large fence posts for building a fort. The tent and its accessories, the stone mill, and 
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the sixteen pila muralis would have weighed around one hundred and six Kg. or two hundred 
and thirty-three pounds.44 A mule or ox, which would have been in the armies train, must have 
carried these things. That still left somewhere between eighty-eight and one hundred pounds, 
without food, for the individual to carry, but with some estimates reaching as low as fifty-four 
pounds.45 The true point of contest here is the amount of food that soldiers carried. Livy 
describes soldiers carrying as much as thirty days worth of rations with them, with each daily 
need measured at about one and eight-tenths pounds for a total of fifty six pounds; Caesar notes 
that Pompey’s soldiers were carrying twenty-two days or forty-one pounds with them.46 A 
soldier carrying that much would have been very prepared, but also been placed under too much 
of a burden. I believe it is possible that the soldier would have carried a part of this burden, while 
the rest was with the baggage train. Thus a soldier could have had plenty of food on him for 
emergencies, maybe ten days or a little over eighteen pounds worth. A surplus was carried with 
the rest of the gear in the train that the men in the contubernia could not carry themselves. That 
would make the total burden the soldier was carrying to be between seventy-two and one 
hundred and five pounds.  
Even assuming the larger figure, this is not an unrealistic load to bear. Junkleman lead a 
group of German civilians across the Alps carrying around ninety-five and one hundred and one 
pounds averaging fifteen and a half miles a day.47 Also, infantry of the modern era are known to 
have endured the same burden and even carried more. The Chindits in Burma during the Second 
World War carried between seventy and ninety pounds, Americans in Operation Torch carried as                                                         
44 Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 77-78 
45 Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War  73-77 
46 Both passages noted in Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 70 
47 Mentioned in Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 73-77. The citizens in the 
experiment were not selected for their physical endurance, but were allowed to train for a time 
prior to the event.  
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much as one hundred and thirty two pounds per man, and British marines and airborne infantry 
carried around one hundred and twenty pounds.48 In addition, Marius is credited with inventing a 
new way for the soldiers to carry their weight. They arranged their load on the end a long stick 
with a crossbar at the top. With this stick carried over the shoulder or balanced atop the shield, 
the weight was carried quite effectively.49 Though the burden is not unthinkable, it should not be 
taken lightly. Carrying this much weight for eighteen miles a day, after which a camp was built, 
would have been exhausting. No wonder Albinus’ shattered army shirked its duties by buying 
personal slaves.  
 When discussing the burden of marching, the climate in Numidia must also be addressed. 
This territory stretched along the coast of North Africa in modern Algeria and part of Western 
Tunisia. Though this region has fairly mild winters, the summers are hot and dry. This is 
especially true in the desert and plateau that take up most of the country. During the summer it 
can become especially dusty there as well, as it was in ancient times as well.50 Along the coast 
the summer temperatures are fairly mild - around seventy-five to eighty degrees Fahrenheit - but 
further inland they can vary from eighty-two all the way to one hundred and twenty degrees 
Fahrenheit. Sallust also mentioned the desolation of the interior when discussing the march to 
Capsa: 
For, except the immediate neighborhood of the town, the whole district is desolate, 
uncultivated, waterless, and infested by deadly serpents, which like all wild animals are 




48 Holmes, Acts of War 120-121 
49 Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 77 
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The winter months are much cooler, and can even see snow. But during winter in ancient times, 
the Roman army would be in their own territory, still performing duties, but not marching long 
distances. During the campaigning season, the burden surely must have been great. Marching 
nearly twenty miles a day for weeks with temperatures nearing one hundred degrees, all while 
carrying around one hundred pounds of gear is a hell of a feat. The Roman soldiers in this war 
had to perform more difficult marches on a few occasions. Certainly the marches that Metellus 
led the army on when he assumed control would have been long and hard because he was trying 
to reinstall discipline in his army. On the march to retake Vaga, the troops were very tired and 
only able to go on because of their vengeful spirits.52 Because of the urgency of this matter, one 
can assume they made this march at double time or faster. To get to Thala, the Romans had to 
march through fifty miles of desert, carrying their burdens plus extra water.53 They had to travel 
one hundred and thirty miles through such terrain to reach Capsa. Sallust does not mention any 
deaths caused by exposure, heat stroke, or any other labor induced casualties, but it is safe to 
assume that some men died because of these marches. Caputo narrates a grizzly scene in which a 
man suffers permanent brain damage as a result of heat stroke during the American-Vietnamese 
War: the man dropped to the ground unconscious, only to awaken and viciously attack the truck 
driver before passing out again. This leads Caputo to comment sardonically on how the 
American men were fighting the sun more than the VC.54 Similar events likely happened in the 
Jugurthine War as well. Not only could the weather be physically harmful, but also 
psychologically damaging. Hot tempuratures can completely sap the will to fight form a man, 
especially long exposure to it. This is again exemplified in Caputo’s recollections of the Vietnam                                                         
52 Sallust, Jug. 68 
53 Sallust, Jug. 75 
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War. He describes a condition that developed due to the heat and boredom called la cafard that 
was characterized by attacks of depression coupled with “inconquerable fatigue” and loss of 
motivation.55 Surely the Roman men fighting in this war were put under tremendous strain by 
these demands placed upon them, and the climate in Numidia certainly added to that strain.   
At the end of the marching day, it was regular practice to build a camp within which the 
army could rest, eat, and sleep. The camp was built with an earthen wall topped by buried pila 
muralis, and trenches were dug in front of the wall. Vegetius tells us that the size of this ditch 
varied on how close the enemy was: if they were near, as Sallust tells us Jugurtha often was, the 
trenches would be dug twelve feet wide and nine feet deep. Its physical benefits are obvious. The 
camp protected the men from wild animals as well as the enemy. Castrametation discouraged the 
enemy from attacking at night when the invading Roman army was vulnerable. This also 
represents a large amount of work to be done by the men after their march was completed. 
Nevertheless it was rarely too large a burden amongst well-disciplined troops working together. 
Just look at the construction feats completed by Caesars soldiers outside of Alesia, which 
encircled the city and again encircled the besieging army in order to protect them from Gallic 
reinforcements.56  
Castrametation provided many positive benefits for the Roman soldier. Most noticeably, 
camps provided physical protection for the soldiers, and their absence exposed the men to great 
danger. Jugurtha had some success attacking stragglers who were not encamped with the rest of 
the army, yet he was forced to change strategies when Metellus started making sure that all men 
were in camp or out in force when not marching.57 Jugurtha and Bochus later routed the Romans 
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just before sunset, seemingly because the Romans were out of their camp.58 Building camp also 
reinforced the army’s discipline due to the labor involved, as seen earlier. In addition, 
subdivisions were charged with a task at which they worked together and helped create a 
communal attitude.59 The soldier would also feel safer while camped in the walls, and this again 
added to morale. The simple presence of the fortifications made the individual feel separate and 
safe from the dangers outside, thus encouraging better sleep. The cessation of castrametation, or 
allowing soldiers to wander from the camp, could lead to a drop in spirits. Albinus’ army 
exemplified this after its defeat60.  
Another important part of life on campaign was pillaging and foraging. Commonly this 
was used to augment the army’s resources, but the army could not have supplied itself entirely 
off of plunder and scavenged food. The local land could not have come close to being able to 
support thousands of men in one place, and the majority of the army would have been occupied 
with other duties. Metellus seems to have let his soldiers plunder in part to terrorize the 
population, crush the fighting spirit of the Numidians, and to force Jugurtha to face him in the 
field. Yet this could be dangerous because the relatively small groups were vulnerable to 
Jugurtha and his cavalry. They were cut down in great numbers. After this happened, Metellus 
changed tactics and only allowed pillaging or scavenging under the supervision of a few cohorts 
and the whole of the cavalry. It is quite possible that pillaging was not only done to hurt the 
enemy but also because it would bolster soldier’s confidence and morale. Marius seems to have 
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introduced his new recruits into the war by allowing them more freedom in their pillaging and by 
attacking and devastating weak targets: 
He (Marius) then attacked some fortresses and settlements that were badly situated for 
defense and ill-manned, and fought a number of small engagements in various places. In 
course of time the new recruits learnt to go fearlessly into action…61 
 
Thus, new recruits became accustomed to killing, death, and the dirty business of war. Pillaging 
also increased the soldiers’ morale by helping them collect more plunder. Metellus allowed his 
men to ravage the country after their pyrrhic victory at the River Muthul in order to regain some 
of their lost confidence.62 In addition, it let the soldiers take out their aggression after weeks of 
dullness. A plunge in morale became a problem for the Romans due to Jugurtha’s harassing 
techniques, so Metellus responded by leading the men into action.63 However, when left 
unchecked, plundering could lead to a complete breakdown in discipline. Excessive pillaging 
was a large factor in ruining Albinus’ army. If too much were allowed, the men would adopt the 
mindset of bandits and would not be accountable to their duties.64 So it seems that terrorizing and 
plundering was an effective way to break up the potentially harmful monotony of the soldier’s 
day. However, it had to be done with strict limitations. These practices supplied the men with 
extra goods, easy experience, confidence, a break from routine, and extra incentives via plunder.  
 A soldier had lots of down time in the winter months when the troops were not on active 
campaign. During winter, the army would retire to the Roman Province in the neighborhood 
where Carthage once stood, near the capital Utica. They would remain here until the summer 
campaign.65 The men would still have had soldierly tasks such as guard duty, latrines, occasional 
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camp changes, et cetera. They were still not on campaign, though, and thus not marching or 
building camp every day. This downtime allowed for training. In the Bellum Jugurthinum, we 
get very little mention of the soldiers training, even the totally inexperienced capite censi. Sallust 
describes the arrangements made by each commander, but does not mention any martial 
preparation for the soldiers. Surely there had to have been some regimen to introduce soldiers to 
their responsibilities. While on campaign they were expected to build camps, form up for battle, 
obey commands, set night watches, assault cities, march in an orderly fashion, bear a load, and 
overcome their enemy in combat. Undoubtedly, some of these soldiers were veterans, and many 
others would have learned the basics of war through family teachings.66 Nevertheless, these tasks 
would have required some amount of preparation, especially for the inexperienced soldiers. We 
get one large mention about training when Metellus took control of the army in the Roman 
province. He put them through “a course of old-fashioned training.”67 As discussed earlier, he 
made sure to keep the soldiers busy with lots of chores like marching with loads, making camps, 
and keeping good watches. The fact that Sallust says “old-fashioned” indicates that these 
practices became regular at some earlier point in the Republic, and that only Albinus’ negligence 
allowed them to lapse. This training did more than just keep the soldiers busy, but it also 
instructed them in their duties. It seems very likely that new recruits would have gone through 
the same routines Metellus forced upon his men before his campaign in order to introduce them 
to Roman martial expectations, despite the lack of mention in Sallust’s writings. These exercises 
would also increase their fitness to acceptable levels. 
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 Training would also have nurtured an aggressive spirit, which was very important in war. 
Iron discipline in the rank and file is often the aspect that many readers associate with Roman 
drill. In reality, it was aimed more at encouraging a bellicose attitude. Vegetius’ treatise abounds 
in emphasis on practice with swords, javelins, arrows, in general athleticism, and swimming.68 
Whether or not soldiers were actually trained in any of these, Vegetius’ remarks show the Roman 
desire to create aggressive soldiers. A man who was confident in his abilities in combat or the 
martial life was going to feel much more comfortable on the battlefield, thus boosting his 
ferociousness and morale.69 Behind this Vegetius stressed fitness and the ability to work hard, 
and lastly the need for order on the march and in the agmen. In drills like the armatura, soldiers 
participated in field maneuvers, but these still focused on personal combat. Phang best states the 
idea. 
…contrary to the modern popular stereotype, and despite stylized rhetorical descriptions 
in Greek authors, Roman infantry training was not dominated by drill and by coordinated 
close-order-formation. Combat effectiveness in sword fighting required a looser order, 
sufficient space surrounding individual soldiers so that they could use their weapons 
freely. They had to engage individual enemies with initiative and aggression. In battle 
and on the march, they were still constrained by formation, but such formations would 
have seemed loose and straggling to an eighteenth-century onlooker.70      
 
As far as combat training for personal skill, we again get little information. It was not included in 
the training that Metellus put the soldiers through. Gladiatorial training is an assumed part of the 
Marian Reforms, but did not start until the war with the Cimbri and Teutones.71 How did soldiers 
learn to fight? As mentioned above, many young men learned from relatives. Due to Rome’s 
imperialistic expansion, most males of the dilectus (draft) likely had relatives with combat 
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experience to share with them.72 Marius’ inexperienced soldiers would have learned other 
associated skills first hand, due to the easy missions Marius sent them on. The more seasoned 
fighters in the army also taught them. Sallust states that after a while in Africa, the raw soldiers 
soon became effective fighters through easy battles and exposure to the veterans.73  
The multitude of duties that the Roman soldier was expected to perform was great. The 
little down time they received was spent eating, sleeping, or, if one were lucky, off duty. One 
large question remains concerning life on campaign. How did it affect the soldiers? If the men 
were expected to do this work daily for too long without achieving their purpose, to meet and 
defeat the enemy, then morale could plummet. This was because of monotonous and difficult 
work that the men were always engaged in, although these were not the only factors the soldier 
was concerned with. There are many unmentioned hardships involved in army life. Living every 
day with these hardships was described in Holmes’ Acts of War as “living rough.”74 Pests like 
bugs and vermin could be a constant annoyance. They may seem trivial, but constant exposure to 
insects is a monumental displeasure. Rats provided a more direct danger in that they could eat 
grain stores, as well as nurture an atmosphere of uncleanliness. Feeling dirty for such long 
periods of time can also take a toll on morale. A pilot named Charles McDonald exclaimed how 
astonished he was over the morale boost he received after a shower and a clean change of 
clothes.75 Nevertheless, the most direct psychological strain put upon the soldiers, outside of 
battle, was Jugurtha’s harassing guerilla tactics. He would pick off a few men, but then refuse an 
engagement. Roman soldiers of this period were enthusiastic to come into close contact with the 
enemy, and if they could not, it greatly discouraged them. Metellus was forced to change tactics                                                         
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not only to counter the Numidian’s pestering, but also to save the morale of his men.76 Marius 
had trouble controlling the soldiery during the conflict with the Gauls, because they were so 




Now we will move on to the climax of the soldier’s experience. Battle is the most 
intensive and widely studied aspect of war, and often the most profound experience for those 
involved. In fact, battle was the peak of the soldier’s purpose; all their previous hard work was in 
order to facilitate it and give them the upper hand in that ultimate task. Despite the 
accomplishments that the men made in training, marching, and construction, and everything else 
in their daily lives, their worth as soldiers and as Roman men came down to their performance on 
the battlefield. Sadly, we do not get much insight into the experience of combat. Sallust was not 
a front line soldier, and his writings shed little light onto the subject. As in our earlier discussion, 
we can fill gaps in Sallust with other knowledge and contemporary writings.  
First we must know the overall face of battle. An understanding of how it was waged and 
of tactics is important to the individual’s experience of it. Certainly, a Spartan hoplite viewed 
battle differently than a Sassanid cataphract not only because of cultural differences, but also 
because of tactical dissimilarities. Thus a Roman legionary’s perspective was dependent on 
Roman strategies/tactics in battle and how he fought in it. This is difficult for us to establish 
because of the transitions that were coming to fruition after years of gradual change, known as 
the Marian Reforms. This has the potential both to greatly complicate our task and to cast serious 
doubt on Sallust as an accurate source.                                                         
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 It is very problematic to determine the type of force that the Roman generals led in 
Africa. Prior to this period, the infantry had been organized in the manipular fashion. In this 
organization, a legion was split into thirty maniples of about one hundred and twenty men each. 
These were then ordered into three types of infantry based upon the men’s wealth and afforded 
equipment: Hastati, Principes, and Triarii. The hastatii were typically armed with chain mail or 
a pectoral plate, a shield, sword, and several pila. The principes’ equipment was very similar 
save for better quality, and the triarii carried even better armor and a spear versus a sword. The 
poorest class consisted of the velites, a skirmishing force armed with several javelins and a 
sword, who would precede the rest of the army. Livy described this force’s use in the Second 
Punic War, and this was the organization many assume was used in Numidia by the Romans 
during the Jugurthine War. In describing Metellus’ formation at the River Muthul, Sallust says 
that archers and slingers were placed among the maniples, indicating the manipular formation.78 
However, in most circumstances when Sallust depicts any type of formation or group of soldiers, 
he uses the term cohors, or cohort, not maniple. In the cohortal organization, the distinctions 
between the infantry classes were eliminated and three maniples were joined to create one cohort 
of roughly four hundred and eighty men. This formation proved to be more flexible in 
accommodating various circumstances. It had the ability to fight jointly with the other nine 
cohorts of the legion, but was large enough to be effective independently. The standardization of 
equipment also made cohorts a more homogenous and organized force. Most scholars seem to 
think that the transformation was slow, but that the cohort had replaced the maniple during 
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Marius’ conflict with the Cimbri and Teutones or Caesar’s wars with the Gauls.79 Sallust could 
have been confused about these logistics for many reasons. By the time Sallust was writing, the 
transition to the cohort was complete, and it is quite possible that he was projecting practices 
familiar from his own day into the past. In addition, previous generals like Scipio Africanus had 
organized their men into cohorts for a limited time and a specific purpose.80 The use of cohorts in 
this war could have been the generals adapting to a specific situation, like when Metellus needed 
to make an assault on the Numidian infantry’s position. 
Gradually, therefore, he got his men together, re-formed the ranks, and opposed four 
legionary cohorts to the enemy’s infantry…81  
 
 Nevertheless, the possibility that cohorts were in standard use is quite plausible. In that 
same battle, Metellus’ legate Rutilius was instructed to secure the riverbank with some cohorts; 
later, Marius was sent to Sicca with a few cohorts. In both of these instances, the word cohors 
was used to indicate a number of men, not just a specific formation, thus indicating that this was 
not simply a temporary and opportunistic change. Another signal for the cessation of the 
manipular system was the increase of poorer soldiers and the capite censi in the army due to 
Grachus’ Lex Militaris and Marius’ reforms. It is likely that the equipment would have been 
standardized for the soldiers who were now supplied by the state and not out of their own 
pockets. This is indicated by the decrease in armor quality in this time period due to the 
increased need of supply.82 Implied is the abandonment of the three infantry classes associated 
with the manipular organization. Marius’ volunteers had no land with which to designate                                                         79 Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (New Haven: Yale 
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themselves a certain class, and they in addition to the poorer men of the draft were being armed 
by the state. The only indication we get of differences in armament within the Roman/Italian 
infantry is the ‘unencumbered cohorts’ mentioned under the command of Rutilius. This could be 
a reference to the velites of the manipular organization, but seems highly unlikely because the 
velites were likely never grouped in an organized way.83 Instead, these men were probably 
stripped of all non-essential equipment in order to make their hurried march easier and to make 
them more ready for combat. Despite these facts, the answer is still quite unclear.  Sallust’s 
vocabulary includes words describing both systems, often very close in location to each other. 
Contradictory words like cohors, velites, and manipulus (maniple) are used intermittently. This is 
quite indicatory of Sallust’s ignorance in the specifics of this subject. Nevertheless, given the 
available information, I believe that there is little reason to doubt that the Romans had adopted 
the cohortal system during this war. We can translate words like velites and manipulus with their 
most literal definitions, ‘light armed/swift ones’ and ‘company’ respectably, as velites was used 
in contexts that do not fit with our strict understanding of this manipular class of infantry, and 
manipulus is even supplied when describing the Numidian army.  
 Outside of unit organization, the standard battle formation of the army was the triplex 
acies, or triple battle-lines. Here, the infantry arranged themselves in three lines so as to facilitate 
the replacement of tired troops and to supply the front-line fighters with plenty of 
reinforcements. In the Battle of River Muthul, Sallust tells us that Metellus formed his men in 
this fashion.84 However, when Metellus led his four cohorts against the Numidian infantry in that 
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same battle, he reformed their ranks, but the formation is not told to us. Presumably, he led them 
in one line due to the hurried nature of the situation. The organization of Rutilius’ men in this 
same battle is unmentioned. Here, there is no reason to believe that these soldiers were not in the 
triplex acies. Sallust says that they were warned by the enemies approach by the dust cloud, and 
thus had time to prepare for battle. Nevertheless, other formations were also possible and 
commonly used as well .The clearest explanation of this is given to us in the very last battle of 
the war, when Jugurtha and Bochus attacked the Romans marching to Utica in the Roman 
province. Here, the army is clearly stated to be marching in a square formation. This was used 
when the army was expecting an attack from any side, or all sides. It proved quite effective in 
this circumstance.  
Typically, Roman tactics were very aggressive. This allowed the infantry to close with 
the enemy and fight it out as quickly as possible. The individual’s fighting techniques are still 
obscure. One hint lies in the space soldiers took in their formation. Vegetius gives us spacing of 
a three-foot frontage and seven feet between ranks, while Polybius gives each soldier a three foot 
frontage and three feet between ranks.85 Whichever is correct, the emphasis on enough room to 
wield a sword and throw the pilum is emphasized. Combat for the Roman infantryman relied 
upon each soldier engaging the enemy with sword and shield. This was the primary purpose and 
preference of the soldier, and being unable to come to close grips with the enemy was greatly 
discouraging.86 At this time, there was no standard training in which a soldier was instructed to 
use their sword, but the distinct shape and size of the gladius hispaniensis seems to have been 
made for a specific technique. Vegetius strongly recommends using the sword for stabbing 
versus cutting, as “A stroke with the edges, though made with ever so much force, seldom kills,                                                         
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as the vital parts of the body are defended both by the bones and armor. On the contrary, a stab, 
though it penetrates but two inches, is generally fatal.”87 The gladius was very well made for this 
style of fighting, since it had such a long and sharp point. This technique seems more indicatory 
of standard training in swordsmanship, which the soldiers of the Jugurthine War did not have. 
The evidence also suggests that the gladius could be used effectively for slashing as well. A lot 
of weight in a short blade would have made it much like a machete. We are told that the dead 
Macedonians left behind by Roman soldiers horrified the seasoned phalangites. They had 
experienced stab wounds from spears and arrows, but never such bodily mutilation, like limb 
removal and decapitation, as caused by the roman gladius.88 Sallust uses the word caedere (to 
cut/hew) to describe the legionaries’ action towards any unfortunate Numidian who came too 
close.89 The shield, or scutum, could also be used as an offensive weapon. A hit from the boss of 
the shield could do considerable damage to unarmored enemies, and would knock them off 
balance. This technique is shown in a scene from the Tropaeum Traiani, in which a legionary 
uses the boss of his shield to punch a man in the face while stabbing him in the gut.90 
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Before they engaged with their melee weapons, Roman soldiers were equipped with two 
pila to throw as well.91 These small javelins gave the legionary some amount of missile 
capability. Sallust tells us that at the siege of Zama, the Romans were being pelted by Numidian 
javelins and were throwing them back.  In this circumstance, the Romans spent a considerable 
time in missile combat, though with limited range. Marius’ slightly altered the pilum so that it 
would be unsuitable for reuse by the enemy by replacing the metal dowel attaching the shaft to 
the long point with one of wood92. This ensured that it would break upon impact so the enemy 
could not throw it back, thus indicating that Roman infantry sometimes spent a fair amount of 
time exchanging missiles with the enemy. Typically though, the pila were thrown before the 
charge. This would deal both a psychological and physical shock to the enemy. Sallust does not 
mention this happening in his account, but there is no reason to believe that it did not. In general,                                                         
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we can assume that the Roman soldiers would use their pila as the situation demanded, not just 
for a pre-charge shock. Nevertheless, the Roman soldiers’ true preference was to engage in hand-
to-hand combat. In this, they would have been more likely to cut or hack with their weapon 
while using their shield as a bashing instrument, though they likely used the point of their 
weapons quite often as well. Still, there certainly was no standard to which they were obligated. 
Thus, their style could have varied greatly, but the preference put with close-quarters combat is 
clear.  
 Still, this is not a sufficient understanding of combat. To arrive at this, we need to 
examine what the experience of battle was like. The first subject to discuss here is the physical 
burden put on the Roman soldier. We have already discussed how the weight that soldiers carried 
was great, but what proportion of this would they have carried into battle? It seems most logical 
that in order to fight most effectively, one must be as unencumbered as possible, meaning that 
they only carried their arms and armor. Their armor, clothing, and weapons probably weighed 
between forty-eight and sixty-five pounds.93 In this period, the armor would include a 
montefortino style helmet, possibly a shin grieve (which would have added weight to the figure 
above), a shield, and a lorica hamata which was a long shirt of chain mail with added shoulder 
reinforcements. A pectoral, a simple disk or square of metal strapped to the chest, would also 
have been a possible feature instead of the lorica hamata. The shield itself weighted close to 
twenty-two pounds. This is a considerable weight to be carrying into battle, especially during the 
summer season in Numidia. All the same, the men were in tremendous shape, and Rutilius’ men 
at the battle at the River Muthul spent their day marching, building camp, fighting and defeating 
the Numidian elephants and part of their infantry. They then marched to re-unite with Metellus’ 
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force.94 Surely this greatly taxed the men, but they did it quite successfully. However, we must 
remember that these men were unencumbered by all of their marching gear as is ideal. It seems 
that the rest of the army was still carrying their full packs in this battle, as they had no time to 
build camp or gather their baggage. These men received the worst of the fighting. They were 
attacked while marching, so they were greatly hampered by their packs. They could have 
dropped their burdens to fight, but they were still responsible for them and had to carry their 
packs when not in direct combat. So it was ideal to relieve the soldiers from all unnecessary gear 
before battle, and this seems to have been the practice, but there were some circumstances in 
which they could not be totally unburdened.  
The length of battle is important when discussing the physical burden on the men. 
Romans fighting in these conditions could not have grappled directly with the enemy for an 
extended amount of time, yet we get many indications that these battles lasted quite a while. 
First, we can tell this because of what Sabin calls the “internal clock.” It is based upon the 
understanding that, though the writer may recount a battle in only a small amount of text, the 
happenings mentioned would almost certainly take a sizable length of time.95  
…Metellus observed that the Numidian attack was weakening. Gradually, therefore, he 
got his men together re-formed the ranks, and oppose four legionary cohorts to the 
enemy’s infantry… So, as evening was no coming on, they stormed the hill facing them 
(these were the orders they had been given) and forced their way up it. The Numidians 
were dislodged from their position and routed.96. 
 
This action surely took a long time, and the whole battle lasted most of the daylight hours. We 
know this because Metellus feared lest his troops “succumb to thirst” in the midday heat when 
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plainning his approach to the battle, and the fighting lasted until evening97. By reading the 
internal clock, we can also claim that the unnamed battle that took place while Marius was 
marching back to Utica lasted from just an hour short of sunset well into the night.98 The men 
could not have been directly engaged this whole time. Throwing, running, cutting, thrusting, 
bashing, blocking, jumping, and other intense actions involved in combat, while carrying armor, 
shield, and sword was unquestionably an exhausting exercise. Even for men as fit as the Roman 
soldiers, these actions cannot be sustained for long. In modern times, contact sports are often 
very short affairs, but require much training: boxing has twelve rounds of only three minutes, 
mixed martial arts has between three to five rounds of five minutes, and judo matches only last 
five minutes total.  
Therefore the battle must have involved alternating periods of combat and rest.99 This 
would have allowed for the removal of wounded men and a short rest for the combatants. Here 
we see another reason the Romans extensively used support troops - so that they could be filtered 
in as fresh replacements in addition to preventing a breakthrough or rout. Metellus likely put 
extra reserves on his right flank at the River Muthul not only for physical support, but also for 
the ability to replace wearied troops during ‘breaks’. Sometimes one side could give way shortly 
after first contact, and Jugurtha’s men turned and ran before the physical engagement in a battle 
shortly before the siege of Thala. Yet the majority of battles in this war were long, protracted 
struggles.  
 A soldier’s mind must have been full of sensations when entering battle. The sound, taste, 
sight, and smell of it must have been terrifying for recruits and veterans alike. Sallust says little 
                                                        
97 Sallust, Jug. 50 
98 Sallust, Jug. 97-98 
99 Sabin, “The Face of Roman Battle” 14 
  37 
about these details but some of them we can be certain of. The noise would have been great: 
swords clashing upon shields and armor, sometimes bringing screams when they bit flesh, and 
men straining and yelling in the heat of struggle. The Numidians used missiles to a much greater 
extent than the Romans, so we can imagine the sight and sound of arrows streaming into the 
ranks, black streaks singing through the air before they thudded against shield, armor, ground, 
and men.  
Shouts of encouragement, joyful cries, and groans, rose mingled with the clash of arms to 
heaven, while missiles flew from side to side.100 
 
The heat would have caused the men to sweat profusely, stinging as it ran into eyes and filling 
their mouths with its bitter taste. Perspiration also has a distinctive smell, and mixed with the 
sickly sweet smell of blood would have been very pungent. As mentioned earlier, the gladius 
hispaniensis dealt horrific wounds, and beholding these would have been quite a shock. The 
sight of blood and mangled limbs was common, unavoidable, and vividly gruesome. This tidal 
wave of senses was of course always combined with the known possibility of death that was 
always present on the field. No wonder Marius thought it necessary to get his men used to killing 
before putting them into combat. How the soldier reacted to these sensations is the ultimate 
question concerning the experience of battle.  
In summation, battle was a very physically taxing thing, and the men would also have 
been bombarded with all sorts of terrifying sensations. It puts great pressure on men not only 
physically, but also mentally. Understanding the physical aspect of combat is greatly significant 
in helping us know how the individual felt, but discussing only this would be to foster a grave 
ignorance. Their physical action was a direct factor of their mental state, morale, and 
motivations.                                                         
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A large aspect of conflict in the Jugurthine War that must be examined is Roman morale 
in combat and what dictated it. In the stressful situation of battle, the direct involvement of a 
commander can mean everything. When his soldiers were barely withstanding the Numidian 
onslaught, Marius was able to save the situation by getting involved himself. Sallust says that 
this was due to the impossibility of giving commands in the melee. Nonetheless, his active 
involvement surely influenced the morale of his struggling soldiers positively, and though the 
troops were under great pressure, there was never a rout. Soldiers look up to their commander as 
an authority and inspirational figure. Their direct involvement can inspire one to sustain their 
struggle.101 Even the participation of lesser officers had an effect, and at the siege of Zama, the 
soldiers who were closest to their commanders were inspired to fight the hardest.102 But just as a 
leader’s involvement could bolster the morale of his troops, it also increased the risk he would be 
wounded or killed. This could be catastrophic and so demoralizing as to cause the troops to 
panic.103 Jugurtha was certainly aware of this when he shouted to the Romans that he had killed 
Marius. This action put them close to flight.104  The individual soldier greatly looked up to his 
commander, especially the volunteers who were in debt to Marius, to such an extent that his fate 
in the battle could directly affect that of the soldier.  
Morale was a greatly influential factor on the battlefield. The Romans troops seemed to 
have a hard time maintaining it in the Jugurthine War because of Numidian fighting styles. 
Jugurtha did a good job of exploiting this as much as he could by engaging the Romans from 
afar, and keeping the Romans uncomfortable by denying them sustained hand-to-hand combat, 
the sort they excelled at. When the Romans were able to come to close grips, they rarely had                                                         
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much trouble defeating the Numidians, as shown by Rutilius’ cohorts at the River Muthul.105 
However, the fighting described by Sallust was decidedly more chaotic and indecisive than the 
typically preferred set-piece battle, and would have been very discouraging for the Roman 
combatant. Romans soldiers were typically very aggressive and were even prone to disobey 
orders so that they could come to grips with their enemy106. So if they could not slug it out with 
their foe, a drop in morale usually occurred. This is first exposed to us at the River Muthul, 
where the Numidians frustrated the Romans from afar with arrows and denied them close-
quarters combat.  
For even the men who resisted with the most dogged courage were  disconcerted by this 
irregular manner of fighting, in which they were wounded at long range without being 
able to strike back or come to grips with their foe107. 
 
It is unlikely that missile injuries were very often fatal, but they were surely dangerous and 
painful, as was medically treating them. A slit would have to be made in order to extract the 
arrow, or it would have to be pushed through. If embedded in the bone, the arrow would have to 
be drilled out. This was done without any sort of anesthetic.108  
We also hear of the Romans suffering from these tactics later in the campaign. Metellus 
decided to attack Zama because the Numidian’s harassing tactics were tiring out his troops. In 
modern wars, the same thing can happen to men under barrage who are unable to respond with 
force. Heavy shelling is understood to be so damaging to morale not only because of the threat of 
death, but also because the soldier has no way to strike back at his aggressors109. The Roman 
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soldier in this war was under a great deal of strain due to their inability to come to grips with the 
enemy, more so than in a great amount of other conflicts.  
Nevertheless, battle was not entirely dependent on the morale of the two forces, yet it 
influenced other important topics that require discussing when examining hand-to-hand combat. 
These topics are the effects of panic and how it directly influenced Roman victory or defeat. The 
contest was decided when the majority of the combatants on the losing side turned and fled. 
Casualty figures give us a hint as to what this looked like. Many battles in the ancient world are 
heavily one-sided in terms of losses. This indicates one of two things: that one side received 
tremendous casualties and ran as a result, or that the one side was provoked to flee and was then 
cut down en masse by the victors.110 It seems overwhelmingly likely that the second option was 
more common. Sallust tells us that after Marius’ recruits had been introduced to battle, they 
realized “that runaways were captured or killed, while the bravest stood the best chance of 
coming through unscathed…”111 This denotes that those who ran were susceptible to the greatest 
danger, thus most casualties were suffered in a rout. We also get instances of the victors actually 
acquiring equal or more casualties than the vanquished. The Romans were victorious at the River 
Muthul, despite Sallust declaring that their losses were much greater than those of the 
Numidians.112 These circumstances would be highly improbable if the first option were true, that 
is, if victory depended entirely on casualties sustained in combat. In fact, Sallust said that the 
only reason the Numidians did not suffer worse losses was because they were quicker and able to 
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escape the Roman swords after they were routed, which of course supports the second option as 
well.113 
 Thus we see that battle was largely not decided by attrition, but by the men of one side 
losing heart and being cut down as they ran. This could have happened because of losses taken 
during combat, but it seems that for the most part a rout occurred because of the appearance of 
defeat more than death rates in the midst of battle. Morale could be a large factor in this 
appearance of defeat, as we discussed above, but was only one of the contributors to battlefield 
behavior. Panic was the other large one. They would fight until they viewed their situation as 
hopeless, whereupon panic took hold. While attacking the unnamed fort near the River 
Muluccha, the defenders abandoned their defenses simply because they heard Roman horns at 
their rear. 
…trumpets suddenly rang out from behind the fort. The women and children who had 
come out as spectators were the first to flee; they were followed by those nearest to the 
wall, and then by the whole of the occupants, armed and unarmed alike.114 
 
The way this is told, it seems that the Numidians panicked not because of any immediately 
tangible Roman victory, but because it appeared that they would be successful. At Metellus’ 
siege of Zama, a great number of Romans in the camp were put to flight due to the sudden alarm 
of Jugurtha’s attack. Some fought, but many were killed in their panic before Jugurtha had 
accomplished any significant damage other than penetrating into the camp.115 Other battles did 
not even require physical contact before they were decided. In one unnamed battle, the majority 
of Jugurtha’s army fled immediately after the Roman charge, and this happened again later 
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because of a surprise charge under the order of Marius.116 In his first hand account of the Battle 
of Guadalcanal, John Hersey describes the panic there almost like a contagion, in which one by 
one, men grew doubtful of their position and once it had affected enough men in the platoon, it 
became a rout. Men were willing to deal with their own fear, but once they saw others showing 
fear as well, a rout was inevitable.117 Sometimes defeat could be caused by seemingly miniscule 
happenings. In one battle in WWII, a man removed himself from the fight after receiving a minor 
wound, only to find the rest of the men following him because they thought that he was 
running.118 There is little reason to believe that such a visceral reaction would have changed 
much in the course of two thousand years. So we can imagine what it was like on the ancient 
field of battle. The experience was much more jumbled than commonly thought. The soldier 
would have been susceptible to a flood of emotions and impulses that were largely beyond his 
control. They ran not because they were tangibly being beaten, but because panic arising from 
the appearance of defeat overwhelmed them and their comrades. Defeat could be directly related 
to the number of casualties taken, but this seems to have happened less than the spread of panic 
among the ranks.  
We may ask how an army could sow panic among their enemies, and more specifically, 
by whom. One of the most prevalent misconceptions about massed hand-to-hand battle stems 
from what I like to call the ‘automaton combatant’. This viewpoint is nurtured by the style in 
which historians tend to narrate battles. In order to cover the whole scale of the event, the author 
must tell the battle as a tale of army against army, in which bravery and other characteristics are 
uniform to the group. This necessity fuels a misconstruction of combat as a massive struggle                                                         
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between two blocks of automatons, or a battle between the sum of the formation’s parts and not 
between the parts themselves. In that battle, each soldier engages the enemy in a uniform fashion 
based upon their training and fighting style. There were many more complexities involved, as an 
army is a mass of individuals working together, yet each acting separately. One man would have 
fought and acted differently from another, and could single handedly play a large role in victory 
or defeat. Though the Romans used regimented formations and units, the battle was still a fight 
between the soldiers in those formations.  
…all infantry actions, even those fought in the closest of close order, are not, in the last 
resort, combats of mass against mass, but the sum of many combats of individuals- one 
against one, one against two, three against five.119 
 
We have already seen that fighting technique varied. The way in which a soldier acted in 
battle would also have been unique, as bravery and action in the face of death is not constant a 
group but dependent on the individual’s characteristics. What this looked like on the field was a 
minority of soldiers striving to defeat the enemy, while the majority fought to stay alive. As 
stated before, in order to get the enemy to run, they had to be convinced they could not win 
which would cause panic to take hold. In the picture of sustained, close quarters combat, this 
would have been done by cutting ones way into the enemy formation. In other situations, 
standing firm while those around you fled, or simply doing what others were too timid to do 
could also serve the same purpose. This clearly took a lot of bravery, as the soldier had to step 
away from the comfort of his own comrades and into the grips of the enemy. The majority of 
soldiers would not have been up for this task, and would have been fighting for survival rather 
than actively to defeat the foe120.  
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In his studies of combatants in WWII, SLA Marshall noticed this very phenomenon. He 
noted that during combat experiences, only about a quarter of the combatants fired their weapons 
or tried to hurt the enemy in any way. The rest stayed in the battle, yet were likely seeking 
survival versus victory. He also observed that this same minority was the group that continually 
acted in an aggressive manner.121 Some veterans and military scholars have criticized his figures, 
but regardless of the specifics of the ‘ratio of fire’ question, Marshall reflects a trend that can be 
attested in ancient times as well. In our context, if we look at the casualty figures given to us by 
Caesar, it seems that this aggressive minority was usually the centurionate. Casualties among 
centurions were much higher than among regular legionaries, and it seems likely that this was 
due to their aggressive fighting.122 They were usually the ones who continually sought to spread 
panic amongst their enemies by attacking their opponents assertively, setting the example for the 
more timid men, and leading them in the dangerous tasks that ensured victory.  
 We see this in Sallust’s account as well. During the siege of Jugurtha’s unnamed treasury 
fort, one single Ligurian was responsible for climbing the cliff to the enemy’s walls and 
discovering a way in. It took much bravery and assertiveness for a lone man to climb up to 
Numidian battlements in order to find a way into the city. Of the small unit of men Marius chose 
to follow the Ligurian into the fort, four of them were centurions. The fort, which had held firm 
against the army for some time, was taken due to the bravery of this small group. Earlier in the 
war, under the command of Metellus, the tide of another battle was entirely turned by a small 
minority. Sallust tells us that when Jugurtha was causing havoc in the Roman’s siege camp 
around Zama: 
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Out of the whole army not more than forty men, mindful of the honor of Rome, banded 
themselves together and took their stand on a slight rise, from which the enemy’s utmost 
efforts failed to dislodge them. As long as the Numidians continued to pelt them with 
javelins from a distance, they kept on hurling them back – and a handful of men 
surrounded by so many could naturally score a higher proportion of hits. If their attackers 
came closer, that was their opportunity to display all their valor: they hewed at them like 
mad until they sent them flying in disorder.123  
 
We have no evidence as to the rank of these soldiers, but the point remains valid. A 
comparatively tiny group was not only able to turn the tide, but also to send the hitherto 
victorious Numidians running.  
Just as the involvement of a leader can set an example, so can that of brave soldiers. After 
they turned the tide, the rest of the army was able to drive the remaining Numidians out of the 
camp. At the siege of Jugurtha’s treasury fort, Sallust says that in the heat of the fighting, the 
best men were being killed, which was terrifying to the others.124 This again hints that a minority 
was willing to face the worst danger, while the rest watched from relative safety. Though these 
are the only explicitly stated accounts of this phenomenon in the Jugurthine War, there is no 
reason not to believe that a minority strongly influenced the tide of other battles as well. 
Therefore we can see how great an influence a small minority, or even one man, could have on 
the outcome of a conflict. The tide of battle was turned based on the actions of a small few who 
were brave enough to expose themselves to great danger that was necessary to attain victory. The 
rest would have fought more conservatively, hoping to ensure their own survival.  
This brings to question the motivation required that influenced soldiers to submit to this 
mortal danger. What drove those individuals to surpass the standard of their peers? We have 
already discussed the factors that drove men to volunteer and submit to military discipline, yet 
these motivations would hardly be tangible while staring death in the face. One would not think                                                         
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about gold or a plot of land when that critical moment was upon him, or while his comrades were 
dying and fleeing around him.125 There are many possibilities to consider: patriotism and ideals, 
a sense of camaraderie and community with one’s fellow soldiers, or a sense of personal honor 
and pride.  
 Sallust says little pertaining to battlefield motivations of the soldiers but tends to focus on 
hypothetical or idealistic factors. In the speech attributed to Metellus before the four cohorts 
lined up for the final push against the Numidian infantry, he is portrayed as entreating them to 
fight bravely by simple necessity. Metellus emphasized to them that they had no place to which 
they may retreat, and that their lives depended solely upon their victory there.126 Vengeance is 
also mentioned as a motivator. Before the attack on Vaga, Metellus exhorted his men to work 
through their exhaustion and kill the enemy in order to avenge their fallen comrades.  The 
Numidians there had massacred the garrison in an act of treachery, and it is quite possible that 
rage could have motivated the men to face their fear. The strongest mention of motivation we get 
from Sallust is in his description the brave soldiers who turned the tide of battle in the struggle 
for the siege camp around Zama. Here, he says that this small group of soldiers stood firm 
because they were mindful of their state’s honor. This is possible, yet Sallust had no experience 
from which to back up his claims. Indeed, he served as a commander under Caesar, but was still 
lacking in front line combat experience.127An individual’s honor was certainly a large factor in 
this topic, as discussed shortly, but the state’s honor was much more unrealistic. Such 
motivations seem a little too hypothetical for practical purposes, and aristocratic assumptions 
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about soldiers’ are often plagued with personal ignorance or bias.128 Also, as we saw before, it 
seems highly unlikely that such abstractions would have been present in the soldier’s mind at 
such dangerous moments.  
 We should look elsewhere in order to ascertain Roman motivational factors. Another 
commonly accepted motivator could be camaraderie. On campaign, Roman soldiers were 
grouped into eight-man groups, called contubernia. These men marched, ate, slept and fought 
together. It is assumed that this proximity would have nurtured friendships between the men, 
which in turn would have motivated them to fight well in the presence of cared-for comrades. 
This would have influenced a soldier to fight harder either because he felt a duty to his unit or 
friends, or to maintain a collective pride. It would also have forged trust amongst the soldiers, so 
that they received not only physical support, but also mental support. This can be observed in 
modern accounts as well, and SLA Marshal noted that: 
I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry 
soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a 
comrade…it is far more than a question of the soldier’s need of physical support from 
other men. He must have at least some feeling of spiritual unity with them if he is to do 
an efficient job of moving and fighting… He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by 
his weapons secondarily.129 
 
This is why the nature of a unit’s formation could often be an indicator of the troops bravery. If 
the presence of a soldier benefited his comrades, the whole group would profit from a more 
dense formation. The hallmark of a truly confident and brave unit was a looser formation.130 
Thus Bomilcar formed his men into a tighter and deeper formation when facing Rutilius because 
he doubted their courage.131  
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The amicable relationship between soldiers certainly mattered, but its effects do not 
adequately cover the subject. A close bond between soldiers was important in creating the 
army’s community and instilling pride in the soldier, but does not create an adequate explanation 
of battlefield behavior. If we look at the above considerations in a different light, I believe we 
can get a more accurate view on what drove the individual to face the dangers of battle. The 
affiliation between soldiers likely played a more ‘negative’ role than previously stated. A greater 
factor was the influence of a system of reward, competition, and honor that Lendon refers to as 
‘outward solidarity’. This motivated soldiers to fight in order to surpass each other in feats of 
valor and to earn personal recognition for their deeds.132 The rewards that men received for their 
bravery supports this idea: the corona aurea was given for non-specific acts of valor, as were the 
torques, armillae, and phalerae.133 All of these were prestige-based rewards given for an 
individual’s dangerous actions in a battle. Sallust tells us that after the Battle at the River Muthul, 
Metellus spent a few days in camp while he treated his wounded and “awarded the customary 
distinctions to those who had done specially good service in the battles…”134 Marius also later 
boasts to the Roman citizenry about his receiving of such awards.135 Men were also greatly 
influenced by the presence and recognition of a commander, likely because it was they who 
would recognize and reward valorous behavior, and thus increase their honor. Before the Battle 
of the River Muthul, Jugurtha: 
…also addressed individually every man whom he had rewarded with a gratuity of honor 
for distinguished service, reminding him of the fact and pointing him out as an example 
to others…136                                                         
132 Lendon Soldiers and Ghosts, 255-256 
133 Maxfield, The Military Decorations of the Roman Army (Los Angeles: University of 
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It is extremely unlikely that Sallust actually knew what Jugurtha said to exhort his men before 
this battle, and he likely invented the dialogue based upon what he thought Jugurtha would have 
said. Thus, we can be fairly certain that Jugurtha’s words here resemble Roman practice, as 
known by Sallust. In Josephus’ account of the siege of Jerusalem and in Caesar’s commentaries, 
both authors acknowledge how the soldiers fought better when under the observation of their 
commander.137 This was likely because of their desire to earn honor for themselves from their 
leader. This phenomenon has survived into the modern age. Caputo remarked how he was 
instilled with a “lasting fear of criticism and, conversely, a hunger for praise” to the extent that 
he would die for a good report.138 
If one was greatly concerned about showing bravery, then certainly they were equally if 
not more concerned with not appearing to be cowards. Shame played a very important role in the 
motivations of combatants. Caesar wrote how “nothing done well or shamefully could be 
concealed, and lust for praise and fear of disgrace drove both sides on to bravery.”139 Thus we 
also read of shame-based punishments that had great effect on mutinous or cowardly soldiers. 
Caesar referred to his men as citizens rather than soldiers in order to shame them into proper 
behavior.140 Other soldiers who ran from battle were required exit the camp through a back door, 
to sleep outside the camp, and to eat barley instead of grain.141 Sallust himself shows great 
contempt for the men who ran in his account of the war, as exemplified by his snide comments 
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towards men who “find that their legs protect them better than their arms.”142 Lack of shame was 
another insult that Romans would accuse cowards of as well, as Sallust did in his treatment of 
Numidian deserters: 
.... no Numidian, after a rout, returns to his post in the kings army; every man goes off 
where he pleases, and this is not regarded as a shameful thing for a  soldier to do, because 
it is the custom of the country.143 
 
Many people in Rome showed disgust towards the men under Albinus’ command who ran while 
they still had the weapons with which to fight and die.144 This likely reflects typical Roman 
sentiment at the time. Running was shameful, and thus one would only bear that shame if others 
were doing the same, or when they were hidden from the judgment of their peers.145 In modern 
studies of soldiers’ fears before combat, it was found that the primary fear was of showing 
cowardice, followed by fear of death, mutilation, and torture after capture.146 
So we see that the main factor influencing Roman soldiers in battle was honor. Fear of 
being a coward kept them from fleeing while rivalry and appeals to reputation influenced them to 
seek victory. Other considerations like camaraderie and the necessity of victory for survival 
factored in as well, but these would likely have been overshadowed by honor-based motivations 
for the majority of combatants. Sallust unfortunately gives us little valuable insight into this 
question, but there is no reason to believe that modern examples did not pertain to Roman men as 
well; societies may change, but such fundamental reactions to danger are unlikely to change 
much in such a relatively small time in the length of human history. By appealing to their honor, 
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Roman commanders were able to influence enough soldiers to the astonishing acts of bravery it 




The personal experience of siege for the attackers would have been strikingly similar to 
that of field combat, making it repetitious to treat every aspect in the experience of siege within 
this study. However, there are a few important distinctions that require separate discussion. The 
strain put on the Roman soldiers, both physical and mental, was more emphasized than in the 
open field. Furthermore, just as the action was more pronounced, the everyday grind would have 
been more strenuous on morale as well. Siege could double the workload of a soldier, a situation 
that, if extended over a long length of time lacking results, would greatly frustrate the men. It 
could also leave them inactive, which as we saw before would be disastrous to morale. Longer 
sieges could last years, and that long spent on a fruitless endeavor would demoralize the men and 
thus doom a campaign. Sieges were tough, not only for the defenders but also for the attackers, 
due to the difficulties in keeping the troops invigorated.  
 First we must examine what ancient siege warfare encompassed. By this time the Romans 
had a capability equal to or greater than that of the Hellenistic East.147 Sallust includes mantlets, 
siege towers, ladders, sapping, and siege mounds in his narratives. Torsion artillery (tormenta), 
or ballistae powered by twisted rope, is only once directly mentioned, but their use is implied 
elsewhere by both the attackers and defenders. It is likely that the towers used to cover the men 
building the siege mound at Thala had torsion machines on them. Rocks, thrown from machines 
and hand, destroyed the Roman mantlets at Jugurtha’s treasury fort. Missiles were the main 
weapons used during these engagements, and the advantage was strongly in the defenders’ favor.                                                         
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Missiles discharged from the height of walls had gravity on their side, and the men under the 
walls were much more exposed to them. These factors are what made the action of siege warfare 
decidedly more terrifying for the Romans in the Numidian war as described by Sallust.  
 Siege warfare would have been much more detrimental to the Roman army than conflict 
in the field. In an assault, the Romans were constantly subject to Numidian arrows, rocks, and 
burning oil. Arrows and javelins would have presented a constant threat of maiming or death, 
while the burning oil thrown from the walls would have instilled much terror in the attackers. At 
the siege of Zama, the defenders rolled massive rocks off the walls, which could cause horrific 
damage to those beneath. All of this would have been dreadful, yet the most terrifying aspect 
would seem to have been the tormenta. These could easily crush a man with their projectiles or 
destroy siege works. Many brave Romans were killed this way, which instilled terror in the 
rest.148 Even for the less aggressive soldiers, there was no respite from the hail of missiles. At 
Zama, the Roman soldiers were accosted by arrows, javelins, sharpened stakes, burning oil, and 
even large rolled rocks to the extent that Sallust claimed: “the danger, though not the glory, was 
shared alike by the cowardly and the brave.”149  
 The rewards and motivations for brave action in siege were much the same; they were 
honor based, but also of higher prestige due to the higher amount of danger. The corona murialis 
and the corona vallaris were both given to the man who was first to climb over the enemy’s 
wall, and both carried more honor than the awards given in the field.150 Officers gave these 
rewards, thus we see men striving harder to overcome the defenders in an attempt to be noticed: 
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At the points where lieutenants or tribunes were in charge, the men exerted all their 
strength, every man working as if success depended entirely on his  own efforts.151 
 
The men strove to earn merit in their commander’s eyes, and thus win glory and its associated 
trophies. Yet other motivations that were dismissed as applicable in battle must be reconsidered 
here. Due to the fact that siege was a drawn out process, the soldiers motivations would not have 
been as ‘knee-jerk’ as they were in battle. Thus, again, monetary reward would have been an 
important factor. Much of the loot earned was taken from captured cities, and this allowed 
Metellus and Marius to cultivate their men’s favor.152 After appealing to the men’s sense of 
revenge, Metellus blatantly tries to encourage them with promises of plunder.153 While an assault 
was taking place, the men would have been subject to strains similar to those of field combat, 
and thus would not be thinking about gold. Yet during the majority of the siege, while they were 
not actively engaged with the enemy, the riches inside the city must have been on their minds. 
The process of taking a city could also prove strenuous on the soldiers because of the 
added workload as well as the dangers of assault. Siege warfare would have demanded the troops 
to build siege works, enclosing defenses, and a siege fort. At Alesia, Caesar’s troops built inner 
walls to trap the citizens of the city, and outer walls to protect them from Gallic reinforcements. 
This represents an extreme, but does show the amount of work soldiers could be expected to do 
during a siege. At Zama, the Romans had to build walls all the way around the city, presumably 
with towers and forts/command centers throughout, as was the practice.154 This work would have 
not necessarily been detrimental to the Roman soldier’s mindset, and most likely was 
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beneficial155, but if the city was not taken easily by their efforts, they might think all their work 
to be in vain. Beyond this initial effort, the siege could last many monotonous days. Some cities 
were captured by surprise and without a siege, but the longest duration given by Sallust for 
sieges in the war was six weeks, and many others seem to have been similar in length. Surely 
there could not have been an assault every day and this left the men a lot of downtime. We have 
seen how this can be very detrimental to discipline and morale, as it is likely that after a while 
the men would start to consider their efforts pointless. Not all experience of siege could have 
been bad, as many ‘easy’ sieges are mentioned, and were a way to introduce men into combat 
and improve morale by letting them fight the enemy. Yet the longer sieges were certainly 
exhausting for the men. They would have been largely inactive day after day, watching the walls 
in the hot Numidian summer whilst occasionally being subjected to the helpless terror of 
assaulting the walls.  
For the men besieging a city, we can be assured that the experience was horrific. Nerves 
would be frayed, and sometimes flesh torn, under the constant rain of missiles during an assault, 
which in extreme cases could have hindered visibility.156 Lack of sleep due to the constant 
demand put on the men by the laborious businesses of siege in addition to the terror of assault 
would put the soldiers further on edge. As in field battle, the din had profound effects on the 
individual’s experience of assault: the sound of tomenta flinging death, missiles clattering onto 
shields and siege works, cracking stone, cries of the wounded and the silence of the dead. 
Casualties inflicted upon the besiegers in these conditions could be atrocious, as seen in the death 
                                                        
155 Goldsworthy, “Community Under Pressure” 202 
156 Ammianus, XIX 2.8 
  55 
of thirty thousand Persian men assaulting Amida in 359 C.E.157 Beyond the combat aspect of 
siege, the experience between assaults was even more damaging for morale due to the tedium 
that prevailed between moments of terror. The heat of the Numidian sun would have exacerbated 
the misery, and the conditions were ripe for la cafard to infect the besieging army. Such factors 
made the life of the Roman soldiers an enormous struggle, and the effects would have been 
equally enormous. Some men would have lost friends or been wounded themselves, and become 
even more distressed by this. The frustration suffered by these men in their efforts to take the city 
had to eventually come boiling up, once given the opportunity. 
When discussing the capture of cities by force, the question of morality and killing 
becomes quite clear. It seems that the brutalization of the citizen population was common and 
accepted. After the Battle at the River Muthul, Metellus took many cities by assault, plundering 
them and killing all the men of military age. His reason for doing this was to bully the population 
and to frighten Jugurtha.158 This was unadulterated terrorism. Yet we sense no distain from our 
author, and he only notes of this technique’s effectiveness. In fact, Sallust hardly uses a negative 
word for these terrible acts, for example the devastation of the land by fire and the massacre and 
complete destruction of Vaga.159 Sallust only comments on the exceptionally bad treatment of 
the people of Capsa, where the citizenry, despite having surrendered, were massacred or sold 
into slavery, and the town was destroyed. Even then his objection was minor and he justified the 
deed.  
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This violation of the usages of war was not inspired by avarice or brutality on the 
consul’s part: the fact was that the place was important to Jugurtha and difficult for the 
Romans to reach, and the inhabitants were a fickle and untrustworthy lot, whom neither 
kindness nor fear had ever been able to control.160 
 
This sort of thing was very common for soldiers of all types to do in those times. Scipio 
Africanus’s men slaughtered the population of Carhago Nova until the Carthaginian commander 
was compelled to surrender161, and Jugurtha had his army killed all the male inhabitants of Cirta 
who had fought for his brother. We get no inclination that the soldiers regretted doing such 
things. In fact Sallust does not say that the slaughter at Capsa was ordered, and could have been 
done by the license of the soldiers. Vengeance and anger could have allowed them to do this: 
Metellus once appeals to the soldiers’ desire for vengeance outside the walls of Vaga, and we 
have seen that the men were likely resentful after a siege. The soldiers would likely have been 
exceptionally bitter after their negative experiences, and took out their frustration on the local 
population. The pent up aggressions and rage would also have been intensified when joined with 
the relief of victory to produce grizzly results.162 Nor did soldiers have the pressure of self-
restraint that was expected of their generals, and thus were not honor bound to limit themselves 
in their anger.163 
Another likely reason for this behavior was again greed. After these massacres, the 
soldiers were enriched by the city’s wealth. The citizen population got in the way of what the 
soldiers wanted, and thus were dealt with harshly. Controlling the soldiers inside the walls was a 
difficult task once a city was taken.164 When the Romans breeched the gates at Capsa, Marius 
had to hurry into the town himself in order to ensure his soldiers fought the enemy instead of                                                         
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immediately going after plunder.165 Nevertheless, the effects of frustration and bitterness on the 
soldiers after a siege must not be underestimated. Monetary motivations surely had their place, 
but history has shown that collective resentment can inspire terrible deeds, for example the Rape 
of Nanking or the massacre at My Lai.166 In some cases, the general himself ordered the 
slaughter of the people, as Metellus did. A sense of duty is not very likely to have motivated the 
soldiers to enact such policies; instead it gave them extra license to pursue their desire for spoils 
or vengeance.  
 
It is unfortunate to be so limited in our exploration for knowledge of ancient warfare and 
the soldiers involved in it. Armed conflict was arguably the most influential episode in shaping 
the course of history, and soldiers were the tools of war and instruments of this change. 
Nevertheless, ancient Roman authors wrote so little about these obscure but important figures, 
and no extant writings from the soldiers exist for study. However, even recent work in this 
subject has mainly focused on battle, as the ancient writers were even quieter about the general 
lives of the combatants. As well as battle, it is highly important to examine the daily routines of 
the soldiers in order to better know the events of the war. The pursuit of seeking understanding in 
this field is therefore a significant task, but also an exciting one. It forces us to explore old 
sources in new ways and with a keen eye for previously unnoted detail.  
Thus, by scrutinizing Sallust’s writings in the Bellum Jugurthinum, I hope to have made 
the soldier’s experience in this conflict more clear. Sallust was not interested in documenting the 
lives of the soldiery, but we have succeeded by comparing scavenged details in his account with 
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other better-known examples. The majority of the soldiers were young men, out seeking glory 
and gold across the Mediterranean landscape in a fight against a foreign despot. The life they 
were drafted into, or volunteered for, and swore to endure was a difficult one, though. The 
campaign’s routine dominated their experience: marching, foraging, building camp, training, 
instilling discipline, and most noticeably a large amount of labor. Nevertheless, their purpose 
was to engage the enemy and to defeat them on the field of battle. The Romans in Numidia saw 
their fair share of action, yet combat was not well suited to their strengths. Though they won the 
major battles and the war, the combat was a grueling experience due to Numidian tactics and 
guile. The sieges would have proven exceptionally difficult, and the frustration often drove men 
to horrendous acts of slaughter. Nevertheless, they persisted, pushed on to victory with a desire 
to earn merit and glory, and to prove themselves up to the task.  
I believe that all the important factors have been covered in as much detail as a study of 
this length will allow. I also consider that this is an exciting realm of research, and that this 
example will influence further study not just into the ‘experience of battle’ question, but also the 
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